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Abstract
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a system of preferential voting employed in multi-seat elections.
Each vote cast by a voter is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. No techniques
currently exist for computing the margin of victory (MOV) in STV elections. The MOV is the smallest
number of vote manipulations (changes, additions, and deletions) required to bring about a change in
the set of elected candidates. Knowledge of the MOV of an election gives greater insight into both how
much time and money should be spent on the auditing of the election, and whether uncovered mistakes
(such as ballot box losses) throw the election result into doubt—requiring a costly repeat election—or
can be safely ignored. In this paper, we present algorithms for computing lower and upper bounds on
the MOV in STV elections. In small instances, these algorithms are able to compute exact margins.
1 Introduction
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a system of preferential voting employed in multi-seat elections. It
is used to elect candidates to the Australian Senate, in all elections in Malta, and in most elections in the
Republic of Ireland [Farrell and McAllister, 2005]. No techniques currently exist for computing the smallest
number of vote manipulations (changes, additions, and deletions) required to bring about a change in the
set of elected candidates—the margin of victory (MOV). The ability to compute this margin has significant
value. In the 2013 election of six candidates to Western Australia’s Senate a discrepancy of 1,375 initially
verified votes was discovered during a recount. The election result was overturned, and a repeat election
held in 2014. If the MOV for the original election was known, the question of whether the loss of these votes
may have altered the resulting outcome could have been answered. In this instance, if the MOV was greater
than 1,375 votes, the inclusion of these 1,375 lost votes would not have changed the election outcome.
In an STV election, each vote is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. For example,
in an election with candidates c1, c2, c3, and c4, a vote [c2, c1, c4] expresses a first preference for candidate
c2, a second for c1, and a third for c4. At the start of the counting process, each vote is initially awarded to
its highest ranked candidate. In the above vote, c2 is the highest ranked candidate. The votes awarded to
each candidate forms their tally. Candidates whose tallies exceed (or reach) a quota, defined in terms of the
number of seats to be filled and votes cast in the election, are elected to a seat. As each candidate is elected,
their surplus (the number of votes by which their tally exceeds the quota) is computed, and a subset of their
votes (with a combined value equal to the surplus) is distributed to their next preferred candidate (in the
above vote, the next preferred candidate after c2 is c1). Where multiple candidates have a quota’s worth of
votes in their tally, the candidate with the largest surplus is elected first, and their surplus is distributed.
Then, if there are still seats to fill, the candidate with the next largest surplus is elected, and their surplus
distributed (and so on). If no remaining candidate has a quota’s worth of votes, and one or more seats
remain empty, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and their votes distributed to their next
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preferred candidates. If the number of candidates remaining (unelected and not yet eliminated) equals the
number of seats left to be filled, these candidates are elected and the STV counting process terminates.
Several STV variants exist, differing in the way that surpluses are distributed [Weeks, 2011]. Consider a
candidate with a tally of 100 votes and a surplus of 40 votes. The Inclusive Gregory Method redistributes
all 100 votes, each with an assigned value of 0.4 (each vote is worth 0.4 votes), to their next highest ranked
candidate that is ‘still standing’ (has not yet been elected or eliminated) [Miragliotta, 2004]. In the STV
variant we consider in this paper, candidates whose tallies have reached or exceeded the quota (but have not
yet been awarded a seat) receive no further votes from the surplus distributions of other candidates.
Computing the MOV of an STV election is an extremely complex combinatorial optimisation problem.
In an election with n candidates, and k available seats, there are
(
n
k
)
possible allocations of candidates to
these seats, and n! different orders in which candidates can appear in the elimination and election sequence.
Our task is to find an election outcome, out of the n!
(
n
k
)
possibilities, that differs from the original outcome
of the election and that requires the least number of vote manipulations to realise.
We develop, in this paper, an algorithm for computing exact margins of victory in STV elections that use
the Inclusive Gregory Method of surplus distribution—arguably the simplest and most straightforward of
the existing variants. In Section 2, we step through the counting process that takes place in STV elections,
under the Inclusive Gregory Method, in two example STV instances. The algorithm we present in this
paper (labelled margin-stv) is an adaptation of existing work for computing margins in Instant Runoff
Voting (IRV) elections [Blom et al., 2016]. IRV is a single-seat variant of STV and is employed in lower
house elections across Australia, in which a single candidate is elected to a single seat. In an IRV election,
candidates with the fewest votes are eliminated, and their votes redistributed to later ranked candidates,
until a candidate attains a majority of the available votes, and is declared the winner. The computation of
exact IRV and STV victory margins is known to be NP-hard [Bartholdi III and Orlin, 1991, Conitzer et al.,
2007, Xia, 2012, Rothe and Schend, 2013, Narodytska and Walsh, 2014].
Ourmargin-stv algorithm represents the outcome of an STV election as a sequence of candidate elections
and eliminations (e.g., c4 elected, c3 eliminated, c2 eliminated, c1 elected). We present a mixed-integer non-
linear program (MINLP) that, given such an outcome, and the set of votes cast in the election, computes
the smallest number of vote manipulations required to realise the outcome. A vote manipulation replaces
the ranking of a vote (e.g., [c2, c1, c4]) with an alternate ranking (e.g., [c4, c3]). Consider an election over
candidates C, in which candidates E ⊂ C are elected to a seat. Our margin-stv algorithm applies branch-
and-bound to search the space of alternate election outcomes (in which the set of winning candidates E′ 6=
E) for one that requires the least number of vote manipulations to realise. We show thatmargin-stv is able
to compute exact margins in some small STV election instances. We develop a relaxation of this algorithm
capable of computing lower bounds on the margin of victory in larger, more realistic STV election instances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the STV counting algorithm.
Preliminary definitions and concepts required in the explanation of ourmargin-stv algorithm are presented
in Section 3. Related work is discussed in Section 4. Mechanisms for computing simple upper bounds on the
degree of manipulation required to alter the outcome of an STV election are presented in Section 5. Section 6
presents our MINLP for computing the smallest degree of manipulation required to realise a specific election
outcome (a specific sequence of elections and eliminations). A rule for computing a lower bound on this
degree of manipulation is presented in Section 7. Using these upper and lower bounding techniques as
building blocks, we present our margin-stv algorithm, and a relaxed variant of this algorithm, in Section
8. We evaluate these algorithms on a range of both small and large STV election instances in Section 9.
2 The Single Transferable Vote (STV)
This section describes the STV vote counting algorithm that we consider in this paper, outlined in Figure 1.
We illustrate this algorithm in the example election shown in Table 1. In Step 1 of the counting algorithm
the quota of the election is calculated, according to Equation 1. This is known as the Droop quota, and
represents a threshold that each candidate must reach before they are elected to a seat. In the election of
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Ranking Count
[c2, c3] 4
[c1] 20
[c3, c4] 9
[c2, c3, c4] 6
[c4, c1, c2] 15
[c1, c3] 6
(a)
Seats: 2
Quota: 21
Candidate Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
c1 elected c2 eliminated c3 elected
τ1 = 0.83
c1 26 — —
c2 10 10 —
c3 9 14 24
c4 15 15 15
(b)
Table 1: Example 1: An STV election profile, stating (a) the number of votes cast with each listed ranking
over candidates c1 to c4, and (b) the tallies after each round of counting, election, and elimination.
Table 1 there are 2 seats to be filled and 60 cast votes. The quota in this election is 21 votes.
Quota =
Total number of votes cast
Number of seats + 1
+ 1 (1)
Each vote cast in the election starts with a value of 1. The total value of the votes a candidate has in
their tally is computed as shown in Equation 2. As the STV algorithm proceeds, votes will move from the
tally of one candidate to that of others. The value of these votes—the extent to which they contribute to a
candidate’s tally value—will change over the course of the algorithm.
Total value of votes =
∑
votes in tally
Vote value (2)
Each vote is assigned to its first ranked candidate (Step 2). The first ranked candidate of vote [c1, c4,
c3] is c1. The total value of the votes in each candidate’s tally is computed. Table 1b shows that the tally
values of candidates c1 to c4 after this first round of counting are 26, 10, 9, and 15. The candidates whose
tally value equals or exceeds the quota are placed in a list sorted in decreasing order of surplus size. A
candidate’s surplus is equal to the difference between their tally value and the quota, as shown in Equation
3. In our example, c1 is the only candidate whose tally has exceeded the quota with a surplus of 5 votes.
Surplus = Tally value − Quota (3)
If this list of candidates with a surplus (denoted surpluses in Figure 1) is not empty, we select the first
candidate in this list, c, and elect them to a seat (Step 9). If we have filled all available seats, the algorithm
terminates (Step 10). Otherwise, we redistribute the votes in c’s tally. Each vote is placed in the tally of the
next most preferred eligible candidate after c in its ranking. Candidates that have been elected, eliminated,
or whose tally value equals or exceeds the quota are not eligible. The set of votes in c’s tally that have no
eligible next preferred candidate are exhausted (not redistributed). The remainder are labelled transferable
(Step 11). These votes will have a reduced value when they are redistributed. Their current value is reduced
by a factor τ known as the transfer value, computed (in Step 12) as shown in Equation 4.
τ = min
(
1,
Surplus of candidate c
Total value of c’s transferable votes
)
(4)
Consider our example in Table 1. Candidate c1 is elected to a seat, and has 6 transferable votes with
ranking [c1, c3]. The remaining votes in c1’s tally have a ranking of [c1]. These votes have no eligible next
preference and are exhausted (not redistributed). The transfer value assigned to c1’s transferable votes is
0.83. All 6 votes with ranking [c1, c3] are given to candidate c3, but they now have a combined value of 5.
If, in Step 4, no candidate has a tally value that equals or exceeds the quota, the candidate c with the
smallest tally value is eliminated (Step 6). The votes in their tally are redistributed to later preferences. The
3
1 Compute the Quota for the election (Equation 1)
2 Assign votes to their first ranked candidates (each vote b has a value of vb = 1)
3 While a seat remains to be filled do
4 Let surpluses denote the candidates whose tally equals or
exceeds the quota (in order of decreasing surplus size)
5 If the surpluses set is empty then
6 Eliminate a candidate c, of those remaining, with the smallest tally
7 Redistribute each vote b in c’s tally to its next preferred candidate at its current value vb
8 Else
9 Elect the first candidate in surpluses, c, to a seat
10 if all seats are filled then stop
11 Compute the number of transferable votes in c’s tally
12 Compute the transfer value τ of these transferable votes
13 Redistribute each transferable vote b in c’s tally with a value of τ vb, where vb
is its current value, to its next preferred candidate (skipping over candidates
that have been elected, eliminated, or are in the surpluses set)
14 If the number of unfilled seats and remaining candidates are equal then
15 Elect all remaining candidates to a seat
Figure 1: The STV vote counting algorithm (under the Inclusive Gregory Method).
votes in c’s tally that have c as a first preference will have a value of 1 (as a consequence of Step 2). Votes
that c has received after prior surplus distributions will have a reduced value. All votes in c’s tally that have
an eligible next preferred candidate (a candidate that is still standing) are given to that candidate at their
current value (Step 7). If the contribution to c’s tally value of a vote is v, then that vote’s contribution to
its next preferred candidate’s tally is also v. Consider again the example of Table 1. After the election of
candidate c1 and the redistribution of their votes, candidates c2 to c4 have tally values of 10, 14, and 15. No
candidate has a quota of votes in their tally. Candidate c2 has the smallest tally value, and is eliminated.
Each of c2’s votes—four with ranking [c2, c3] and 6 with ranking [c2, c3, c4]—still have a value of 1 and are
redistributed to candidate c3. Candidates c3 and c4 now have tally values of 24 and 15.
After a candidate has been elected or eliminated, we check whether the number of unfilled seats and the
number of remaining candidates (that have not yet been elected or eliminated) are equal (Step 14). If so, all
remaining candidates are elected to a seat irrespective of their tally value (Step 15). If not, the total value
of the votes in each remaining candidate’s tally is recomputed and we return to Step 4. In the example of
Table 1, the algorithm recomputes the tally values of candidates c3 and c4 in Step 4, and places c3 in the
surpluses list. Candidate c3 is elected to the final seat, and the algorithm terminates in Step 10. The STV
algorithm proceeds in rounds that consist of: computing the total value of each candidate’s tally; electing the
candidate with the largest surplus (if such a candidate exists) and redistributing their votes; or eliminating
the candidate with the smallest tally value (if no candidate has a quota) and redistributing their votes.
Let us consider a second example STV election, shown in Table 2. Candidates c1, c2, c3, and c4 have
initial tallies of 31, 17, 5, and 10 votes. The quota for the election is 22, and c1 is placed into the list of
candidates with a surplus in Step 4. Candidate c1 is elected to the first of two available seats in Step 9, and
has 13 transferable votes in their tally (Step 11). The transfer value to be applied to those votes is 0.69 (its
surplus of 9 divided by the number of transferable votes 13). In Step 13, candidate c2 is given 5 votes of
ranking [c1, c3], with the total value of these votes equal to 3.46. Candidate c4 is given 8 votes of ranking
[c1, c4, c2, c3], with the total value of these votes equal to 5.54. In the second round of counting, c2 now has
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Ranking Count
[c1, c2, c3] 5
[c1] 18
[c4, c3] 10
[c3, c2, c4] 5
[c2, c4, c3] 17
[c1, c4, c2, c3] 8
(a)
Seats: 2
Quota: 22
Candidate Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
c1 elected c3 eliminated c2 elected
τ1 = 0.69
c1 31 — —
c2 17 20.46 25.46
c3 5 5 —
c4 10 15.54 15.54
(b)
Table 2: Example 2: An STV election profile, stating (a) the number of votes cast with each listed ranking
over candidates c1 to c4, and (b) the tallies after each round of counting, election, and elimination.
a total tally value of 20.46 votes and c4 a total tally value of 15.54. No candidate has a quota, and candidate
c3, with the smallest tally, is eliminated (in Step 6). Candidate c2 is given 5 votes with ranking [c3, c2, c4].
In the next round of counting, candidate c2 has exceeded a quota and is elected to the last seat (Step 9).
In many STV variants, the last bundle of votes received by a candidate, at any point in the counting
process, is known as their last parcel. In the Original Gregory Method, votes in an elected candidate’s last
parcel (and no others) are transferred (at a fraction of their value) during surplus distribution. The total
value of the votes transferred is equal to the candidate’s surplus. Some jurisdictions do not assign fractional
values to distributed votes, but transfer a random selection of votes from a candidate’s last parcel at their
full value, the total of which equals the candidate’s surplus. Much of the complexities involved in vote
distribution across these variants are in place to support easier and faster manual vote counting. Weeks
[2011] and Miragliotta [2004] provide a good summary of the range of STV variants used in practice.
3 Preliminaries
Definition 1 formally defines an STV election E . Our representation of the outcome of an STV election—as a
sequence of candidate elections and eliminations—is outlined in Definition 2. The margin of victory (MOV)
of an STV election is defined in Definition 3. The primary vote of a candidate c is computed as described in
Definition 4, and used to compute simple upper bounds on the MOV of an STV election in Section 5.
Definition 1. STV Election (E) An STV election is defined as a tuple E = (C,B,Q, N,E) where C is a set
of candidates, B the set of votes cast in the election, Q the election quota (the number of votes a candidate
must attain to be elected to a seat, as defined in Equation 1), N the number of seats to be filled, and E
the set of candidates elected to a seat (according to the counting algorithm outlined in Figure 1). Each
vote b ∈ B is a partial or complete ranking over C (e.g., the vote [c1, c3, c2], in an election with candidates
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, expresses a first preference for candidate c1, a second for c3, and a third for c2).
Definition 2. Election Order (π) Given an STV election E = (C,B,Q, N,E), we represent the outcome
of the election as an election order π—a sequence of tuples (c, a) where c ∈ C and a ∈ {0, 1}. The tuple (c, 1)
indicates that candidate c is elected to a seat, and (c, 0) that c is eliminated. An election order π defines the
sequence of elections and eliminations that arise as the STV counting algorithm (Figure 1) is executed. The
order π = [(c1, 1), (c3, 0), (c2, 0), (c4, 1)], for example, indicates that candidate c1 is elected to a seat in the
first round of counting, followed by the elimination of candidates c3 and c2, and the election of c4.
Definition 3. Margin of Victory (MOV) The margin of victory for an STV election E = (C,B,Q, N,E)
is defined as the smallest number of vote manipulations required to ensure that a set of candidates E′ 6= E
are elected to a seat (i.e., at least one candidate in E′ must not appear in E). A single manipulation changes
the ranking on a single vote b to an alternate ranking. For example, consider a vote b with ranking [c1, c3,
c2]. Replacing b’s ranking with the alternate ranking [c4, c1] represents a single manipulation.
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Definition 4. Primary Vote fp(c) The primary vote of a candidate c ∈ C in an STV election E =
(C,B,Q, N,E) is defined as the total number of votes in B in which c is ranked highest (i.e., c is ranked
first). For example, the vote [c1, c3, c4] contributes to the primary vote of candidate c1.
4 Related Work
The computation of victory margins in both STV and Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections is NP-hard
[Bartholdi III and Orlin, 1991, Conitzer et al., 2003, 2007, Xia, 2012, Rothe and Schend, 2013, Narodytska and Walsh,
2014]. To the best of our knowledge, the algorithms presented in this paper form the first attempt to compute
margins in STV elections. Blom et al. [2016] present a branch-and-bound algorithm for computing victory
margins in IRV elections, itself an adaptation of earlier work by Magrino et al. [2011]. An IRV election elects
a single winner w from a field of candidates C on the basis of the votes B cast in the election. As in an STV
election, each vote b ∈ B is a (possibly partial) ordering over the candidates in C. An IRV election proceeds
in rounds of candidate elimination. Each vote is placed in the tally of the candidate c that appears first in
its ordering. In the first round, the candidate with the least votes in their tally is eliminated. Each of these
votes is placed in the tally of its next preferred candidate. Votes with no next preferred candidate become
exhausted (are not redistributed). This process of candidate elimination is repeated until only a single can-
didate remains—this candidate is the winner of the election. Unlike IRV, STV elects multiple candidates
with the counting algorithm alternating between rounds of candidate election and candidate elimination.
The votes in the tallies of elected candidates are redistributed at a reduced value.
Magrino et al. [2011] represent the outcome of an IRV election as a candidate sequence π with candidates
listed in the order in which they are eliminated (with the last candidate being the winner). Given such
a sequence π, and a collection of votes, a linear program (LP) is presented that computes the smallest
number of vote manipulations required to realise π. This linear program is labelled DistanceTo. In an
election with winner w, Magrino et al. [2011] search the space of alternate elimination sequences (in which a
candidate other than w is elected) for one requiring the least number of vote manipulations to realise. A key
observation made by Magrino et al. [2011] is that, given a partial sequence of candidates π′, theDistanceTo
LP computes a lower bound on the number of vote manipulations required to realise any elimination order
that ends in π′. Magrino et al. [2011] progressively explore and build partial candidate elimination orders in
a branch-and-bound algorithm. The last round margin (LRM) of the election (defined as the difference in the
tallies of the winning candidate and runner-up, divided by two and rounded up) is used as an upper bound
on the MOV. Consider an IRV election with candidates c1, c2, c3, and c4, with outcome [c4, c3, c2, c1], where
c1 is the winning candidate. Partial orders containing a single candidate (not including the original winner
c1) are added to a tree. DistanceTo is applied to each partial order π
′ in this tree to compute a lower
bound on the number of vote manipulations required to realise an elimination sequence ending in π′. The
partial order π′ with the smallest DistanceTo evaluation is expanded by adding a candidate (not already
in π′) to the start of the sequence. Partial orders with evaluations equal to or larger than the current upper
bound are pruned. When a complete elimination order (involving all candidates) is formed, its DistanceTo
evaluation is used to revise the current recorded upper bound. The algorithm terminates once all partial
orders have either been expanded or pruned, with the revised upper bound returned as the MOV.
Blom et al. [2016] improve the efficiency of the branch-and-bound algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011] by
introducing new rules for computing lower bounds on the manipulation required to realise each partial order
in the search tree. These rules typically result in tighter (i.e., higher) lower bounds for each partial order
than supplied by solving the DistanceTo LP. Consequently, Blom et al. [2016] are able to: prune larger
portions of the space of partial elimination sequences; reduce the number of calls to the DistanceTo LP;
and quickly compute margins in elections for which the algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011] times out after 72
hours of computation. Our margin-stv algorithm shares a similar structure to that of Blom et al. [2016]
and Magrino et al. [2011], in that it searches the space of alternate election and elimination sequences using
branch-and-bound. Themargin-stv algorithm differs in several key aspects: each node is a partial sequence
of candidate elections and eliminations (in place of a sequence of eliminations); a MINLP (in place of an LP)
is used to evaluate nodes in this search tree; and the descendants of a partial sequence π′ are all complete
6
1 weub ← |B|
2 E ← candidates (eventually) elected
3 for each round of counting j do
4 if a candidate is eliminated in round j do
5 cj ← candidate eliminated in round j
6 vj ← number of votes in cj ’s tally in round j
7 for each w ∈ E that has not yet been elected by round j do
8 wj ← number of votes in w’s tally in round j
9 ∆ ← ⌈wj − vj⌉
10 weub ← min(∆, weub)
11 if ⌈wj −
1
2vj⌉ is less than or equal to tallies of all candidates still standing (excluding cj) do
12 weub ← min(⌈wj −
1
2vj⌉, weub)
13 return weub
Figure 2: The winner elimination upper bound of Cary [2011] applied to compute an upper bound (denoted
weub) on the MOV of an STV election (as used by Chilingirian et al. [2016]). The notation B and E denote
the set of votes cast in the election, and the set of candidates elected to a seat, respectively.
sequences that start with π′ (in place of all sequences than end in π′). Moreover, a variation of the winner
elimination upper bound for IRV elections [Cary, 2011] is used as an initial upper bound on the STV MOV
(as described by Chilingirian et al. [2016]). Section 8 describes the margin-stv algorithm in detail.
The winner elimination upper bound (on the IRV margin of victory) of Cary [2011] finds the most efficient
way to eliminate the apparent winner of an IRV election at each elimination round, returning the least-cost
(involving the smallest number of vote changes) of these. Chilingirian et al. [2016] develop a version of this
upper bound for use in STV elections. Figure 2 outlines this STV variant of the winner elimination upper
bound. Consider the example STV election of Table 1, where c1 was elected in the first round of counting,
c2 eliminated in the second, and c3 elected in the third (at which point both available seats had been filled).
Following the algorithm listed in Figure 2, the winner elimination upper bound (weub) is initially set to the
total number of votes cast in the election (Step 1), which is 60. The set of candidates that are (eventually)
elected is E = {c1, c3}. In the first round of counting, a candidate (c1) is elected. The algorithm moves on
to the second round (Step 3), in which a candidate (c2) is eliminated with 10 votes (v2 = 10 in Step 6). In
Step 7, we consider each candidate in E that has not been elected by round 2—candidate c3—and determine
how they could be eliminated in this round. Candidate c3 has 14 votes in round 2 (w2 = 14 in Step 8). We
could certainly eliminate c3 by taking 4 votes from their tally (∆ = 4 in Step 9) and giving them to some
other candidate (c2, for example). However, candidate c3 can still be eliminated in this round if we take 2
votes from their tally and give them to c2 (Steps 11 and 12), under the assumption that we can break the
resulting tie between c3 and c2 in c2’s favour. The winner elimination upper bound is set to 2 in Step 12.
The algorithm moves on to the last round of counting in which no candidate is eliminated. Steps 5 to 12 are
skipped and a winner elimination upper bound of 2 is returned.
To the best of the authors knowledge, the work of Chilingirian et al. [2016] describes the only attempt to
compute bounds on the MOV for STV elections (in its adaptation of the winner elimination upper bound of
Cary [2011]). The algorithms we present in this paper are, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempts
to compute exact margins in small STV elections and lower bounds on the MOV in larger instances. IRV
elections, in contrast, have received more consideration. Blom et al. [2016] and Magrino et al. [2011] present
algorithms for computing exact margins in IRV elections. A number of works have presented algorithms for
computing lower and upper bounds on IRV margins (see Cary [2011] and Sarwate et al. [2013]).
The focus of this paper is the computation of the MOV for STV elections. This MOV is defined as the
smallest number of vote manipulations (the replacing of the ranking of a vote with an alternate ranking)
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required to ensure that a different set of candidates is elected (i.e., at least one candidate in this set is replaced
with one that was not originally elected to a seat). Similar questions have been considered for alternate voting
rules. The complexity of manipulating an election with bribery is considered by Faliszewski et al. [2009],
under a number of voting schemes: Condorcet-based; approval voting; scoring rules; veto rules; and plurality.
Their aim is to find a manipulation to achieve a desired election result, while minimising the cost of bribes
given to voters for changing their vote. If the cost of bribing a voter to change their vote is 1, this least cost
set of bribes is equivalent to the margin of victory, as we have defined it. Kaczmarczyk and Faliszewski [2016]
consider a variant of the bribery problem (destructive shift bribery) in which voters can be bribed to demote
the position of a candidate c in their ranking by p positions (i.e., to move a candidate down in their ranking
by p positions) in a bid to ensure that c does not win the election. The authors analyse the complexity
of destructive shift bribery for a number of voting rules (k-Approval, Borda, Copeland and Maximin).
Polynomial-time algorithms are presented for computing the smallest set of desired bribes in the case of the
k-Approval, Borda, and Maximin rules, while the problem is shown to be NP-complete for the Copeland
rule. Schu¨rmann [2017] describe a model-checking-based approach for the computation of margins in D’Hondt
elections, applying their approach to the 2015 Danish national parliamentary elections. The STV elections
we consider in this paper vary considerably from the voting rules considered by Kaczmarczyk and Faliszewski
[2016], and Schu¨rmann [2017]. We refer the reader to Brandt et al. [2016] for further discussion on bribery
and manipulation problems in the computational social choice context.
Given an STV election E , our margin-stv algorithm relies on: a mechanism for computing an upper
bound on the manipulation required to change the outcome of E ; a mechanism for computing the smallest
manipulation required to realise a specific outcome for E—a specific sequence of candidate eliminations and
elections π; and a mechanism for computing a lower bound on the degree of manipulation required to realise
a candidate order that starts with a partial sequence of elections and eliminations π′. These mechanisms are
provided in Sections 5 to 7, and form the basis of our branch-and-bound algorithm.
5 Simple Upper Bounds on the STV MOV
Figure 2 presents an algorithm for computing an upper bound (a winner elimination upper bound) on the
STV MOV1. In elections where all seats are filled by a candidate prior to any eliminations taking place (e.g.,
an election with 2 seats, 4 candidates, and outcome [(c1, 1) (c2, 1), (c3, 0), (c4, 0)]), this algorithm is not
able to reduce the upper bound from its original value (the total number of votes cast in the election). In
these instances, we introduce a simple bound on the STV MOV, computed as follows. Consider an election
E = (C,B,Q, N,E). The STV counting algorithm of Figure 1 elects candidates to a seat once the number
of votes in their tally reaches or exceeds Q. To change the outcome of E , with winning candidates E ⊂ C,
we must find a series of vote manipulations that elects a candidate c ∈ C \ E to a seat. It is clear that we
can elect c ∈ C \E, with primary vote fp(c) (the total number of votes in B in which c is ranked first), if we
take Q− fp(c) votes away from other candidates and give them to c (we replace the ranking of these votes
by a ranking that preferences c first). We compute Q− fp(c) for each c ∈ C \E and take the smallest result
as an upper bound on the STV MOV. We call this bound the Simple-STV upper bound.
6 Computing Minimal Manipulations: A MINLP
Given an IRV election and a sequence of candidate eliminations π′, Magrino et al. [2011] present a linear
program (LP) for computing the smallest number of vote manipulations required to ensure candidates are
eliminated in the order specified in π′. In this section, we present a mixed-integer non-linear program
(MINLP) that, given an STV election E = (C,B,Q, N,E), and a candidate order π (a sequence of candidate
elections and eliminations), computes the smallest number of vote manipulations (changes to votes in B)
1This algorithm has been extracted from the work of Chilingirian et al. [2016]. The algorithm is not explicitly presented in
that paper, but can be found in code, implemented by Andrew Conway, for analysing the 2012 local government elections in
New South Wales, Australia. This code is available at: https:/github.com/SiliconEconometrics/PublicService
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required to realise π. We re-use some notation and constraints introduced in the LP of Magrino et al. [2011].
The votes in B form the original profile of the election. The MINLP below, denoted DistanceToSTV ,
introduces variables indicating which votes in B are to be changed, and what their ranking will be in a new
or modified profile. The constraints of the following MINLP are designed to enforce a specific candidate
order π by modifying the smallest number of votes in B (where required).
6.1 Notation
Sets and Indices
s,S A signature s ∈ S is a partial or total ranking over the candidates in C; S is the set of all
possible partial or total rankings over C (including those that do not appear on a vote in B).
R The set of rounds of counting in the election—in each round a candidate is either elected to
a seat or eliminated.
Pij The subset of vote signatures that could possibly be in the tally of candidate i ∈ C at the
start of round j (this can be inferred on the basis of the order of candidates in π).
π[j] The candidate that is elected or eliminated in round j (according to π).
Bsij The set of candidates that appear before candidate i in the preference ordering of signature
s ∈ S that are still standing (have not been elected or eliminated) at the end of round j.
Sj The set of candidates still standing at the start of round j.
π+ The subset of candidates in C that are elected to a seat according to π.
π− The subset of candidates in C that are eliminated according to π.
Constants
Ns Number of votes with signature s ∈ S cast in election E (i.e., the number of votes in B whose
ranking matches signature s).
UB Known upper bound on the number of vote manipulations required to realise π (such as the
winner elimination upper bound of Figure 2 or the Simple-STV upper bound of Section 5).
Decision Variables
ps Integer number of votes in B that are modified so that their new signature is s ∈ S.
ms Integer number of votes whose signature in B (the original profile) is s ∈ S, but are modified
to something other than s in the new profile.
ys Integer number of votes with signature s ∈ S in the new election profile.
τj Transfer value of votes being redistributed from an elected candidate in round j.
ρj Number of votes eligible for transfer, from the candidate elected to a seat in round j, to
candidates that are still standing at the end of round j.
qij Binary variable with a value of 1 if the tally of candidate i exceeds or equals the quota at
the start of round j, and 0 otherwise.
vij Floating point number of votes in the tally of candidate i at the start of round j.
yijs Floating point number of votes with signature s ∈ S in the tally of candidate i at the start
of round j.
dijs Floating point number of votes with signature s ∈ S transferred to candidate i from the
candidate elected or eliminated in round j.
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6.2 Objective
The objective of DistanceToSTV is to minimise the number of votes in B whose signature is changed.
z = min
∑
s∈S
ps (5)
6.3 Constraints
Constraints (6) and (7) appear in the LP of Magrino et al. [2011]. Constraint (6) ensures that the total
number of votes in the new election profile (after manipulation) is equal to the total number of votes in the
original profile. This assumption is made by both Blom et al. [2016] and Magrino et al. [2011]. Blom et al.
[2016] explore variations of the DistanceTo LP of Magrino et al. [2011] in which this constraint is removed,
and a manipulation may add votes (for example, arising from voters voting multiple times), or remove votes
(for example, arising from ballot box losses). We intend, in future work, to consider the ‘deletion-only’ and
‘addition-only’ settings analysed by Blom et al. [2016] for IRV elections, in the STV setting. Constraint (7)
defines the number of votes with signature s ∈ S in the new profile, ys.
∑
s∈S
ms =
∑
s∈S
ps (6)
ys = Ns + ps −ms ∀ s ∈ S (7)
Constraint (8) ensures that candidates who have achieved a quota by round j, have also achieved a quota
by round j + 1. Constraints (9) and (10) ensure that that number of votes a candidate i has in their tally
at the start of round j is greater than or equal to Q if i has achieved a quota by round j (qij is 1) and less
than Q otherwise (qij is 0, and ǫ≪ 1).
qi,j−1 ≤ qij ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R (8)
vij ≥ qij Q ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R (9)
vij ≤ (1− qij) (Q− ǫ) + qij |B| ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R (10)
Constraints (11) and (12) define the number of votes of signature s ∈ S in candidate i’s tally at the start
of round j. Where j > 1, this is equal to the number of votes of signature s ∈ S in candidate i’s tally at the
start of the previous round, plus the number of votes of signature s ∈ S distributed to i from the candidate
elected (or eliminated) in round j − 1. As all votes of a single signature s will reside in the tally of only one
candidate at any point in time, at least one of yi,j−1,s and di,j−1,s will be zero in each instance of Constraint
(12). Although the order in which candidates are elected and eliminated is fixed (to that defined by π),
the round in which a candidate is given, via distribution, votes of certain signatures can vary. Consider
a candidate c whose tally has reached or exceeded the quota in round j. Candidate c may have to wait
several rounds to be elected to a seat, if one or more other candidates have also reached a quota by round j,
and have more votes in their tallies (they are elected before c). While candidate c is waiting to be elected,
they are not given any additional votes during the distribution of the surpluses of elected candidates—these
votes skip c and are given to the next eligible candidate in their ranking. As the candidate order π does not
prescribe exactly when an elected candidate achieves a quota, we must support the possibility that votes of
certain signatures s ∈ S can be distributed to a candidate in one of a number of different rounds. Constraint
(13) sums the total number of votes for candidate i at the start of round j.
yi1s = ys ∀ i ∈ C, s ∈ Pij (11)
yijs = yi,j−1,s + di,j−1,s ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R, j > 1, s ∈ Pij (12)
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vij =
∑
s∈Pij
yijs ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R (13)
Constraint (14) ensures that the candidate elected to a seat in round j has more (or an equal number of)
votes in their tally at the start of round j than all other candidates who are still standing (have not been
eliminated or elected before round j). Conversely, a candidate who is eliminated in round j must have fewer
(or an equal number of) votes in their tally at the start of round j than all other candidates who are still
standing (Constraint (15)). Moreover, a candidate can only be eliminated in a round if no other remaining
candidate has a quota’s worth of votes in their tally at the start of the round (Constraint (16)).
vpi[j],j ≥ vkj ∀ j ∈ R.π[j] ∈ π
+, k ∈ Sj \ {π[j]} (14)
vpi[j],j ≤ vkj ∀ j ∈ R.π[j] ∈ π
−, k ∈ Sj \ {π[j]} (15)
qij = 0 ∀ j ∈ R.π[j] ∈ π
−, i ∈ Sj (16)
Constraint (17) defines the value of variable dijs (the total number of votes of signature s distributed
to candidate i in round j after candidate π[j] is elected or eliminated). Recall that the set Pij denotes the
subset of signatures s ∈ S that could possibly be in candidate i’s tally at the start of round j. The set
Ppi[j],j ∩ Pi,j+1 contains only those signatures that could possibly be distributed from π[j] (the candidate
elected or eliminated in round j) to candidate i—the subset of signatures that could have been in π[j]’s
tally in round j and in the tally of candidate i at the start of round j + 1. If π[j] is eliminated (π[j] ∈ π−),
any votes distributed to another candidate are distributed at their current value (dijs = ypi[j],j,s for all
s ∈ Ppi[j],j ∩ Pi,j+1). If π[j] is elected, candidate i may receive their votes of signature s ∈ Ppi[j],j ∩ Pi,j+1
(at a reduced value) only if i does not already have a quota’s worth of votes and is either the next preferred
candidate in s, or all candidates that appear between π[j] and i in s already have a quota’s worth of votes.
dijs =


ypi[j],j,s if π[j] ∈ π
−
τj ypi[j],j,s (1− qij)
∏
k∈Bsij
qkj if π[j] ∈ π
+ ∀ i ∈ C, j ∈ R, s ∈ Ppi[j],j ∩ Pi,j+1 (17)
Upon the election of a candidate c, a subset of the votes in their tally (those for which there is a next
preferred candidate that is still standing—not yet eliminated or elected—and whose tally has not already
reached or exceeded the quota) are distributed to one or more alternate candidates. These votes are called
transferable votes. The remainder become exhausted (there is no such ‘next preferred’ candidate for these
votes). The number of transferable votes in a candidate c’s tally, upon their election in round j, denoted ρj ,
is defined in Constraint (18). The transfer value assigned to these votes is dependent on both the size of c’s
surplus (the value of votes in their tally minus the quota) and the total value of the transferable votes in c’s
tally (the votes that have a valid next preferred candidate). This transfer value τj , and its relationship to the
quantity of transferable votes in an elected candidate’s tally ρj , is defined in Constraint (19). Both of these
variables are relevant only in rounds in which a candidate is elected to a seat, and a surplus is distributed.
ρj =
∑
i∈Sj
∑
s∈Ppi[j],j∩Pi,j+1
ypi[j],j,s (1− qij)
∏
k∈Bsij
qkj ∀ j ∈ R, π[j] ∈ π
+ (18)
τj ρj = vpi[j],j −Q ∀ j ∈ R, π[j] ∈ π
+ (19)
Constraint (19) yields incorrect transfer values—that are greater than one—in the event that the total
value of the transferable votes in an elected candidate c’s tally is less than their surplus. This can occur if a
large portion of c’s votes become exhausted once they are elected (votes that define a partial ordering over
the set of candidates become exhausted when the last candidate in their ordering is eliminated or elected).
In this circumstance, the transfer value of c’s transferable votes is set to 1 (i.e., these votes are distributed
at their current value). This is consistent with how STV elections are counted in practice. Constraint (19)
is thus rewritten as shown in Constraint (20).
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τj =
{
1 if ρj ≤ vpi[j],j −Q
vpi[j],j −Q otherwise
∀ j ∈ R, π[j] ∈ π+ (20)
7 Computing Lower Bounds for Partial Candidate Orders
Magrino et al. [2011] present an LP for computing the smallest number of vote manipulations required to
realise a sequence of candidate eliminations in a given IRV election. This LP, when applied to a partial
elimination sequence π′ (under the assumption that all candidates not in π′ have already been eliminated
and their votes distributed to candidates in π′), computes a lower bound on the manipulations required to
realise an elimination sequence ending in π′. Similarly, we can apply DistanceToSTV to a partial sequence
of candidate elections and eliminations π′ (a partial candidate order) to compute a lower bound on the
manipulations required to realise a complete order (including all candidates) that starts with π′.
Consider the STV election of Table 1 with candidates c1, c2, c3, and c4. Given the partial order [(c1, 0),
(c3, 1)], DistanceToSTV computes the smallest number of vote manipulations required to ensure that:
• Candidate c1 has the fewest votes in the 1
st round of counting (fewer votes than c2, c3, and c4);
• No candidate has a quota’s worth of votes in their tally in the 1st round;
• Candidate c3 has a quota’s worth of votes in their tally in the 2
nd round; and,
• Candidate c3 has the most votes in their tally in the 2
nd round (more votes than c2 and c4).
For any complete order π that starts with [(c1, 0), (c3, 1)], DistanceToSTV will ensure that the above
constraints hold in addition to constraints that enforce the remaining elections and eliminations in π. For
any partial order π′, the set of constraints enforced by DistanceToSTV is a subset of those enforced for any
complete order starting with π′. Consequently, solving DistanceToSTV for π
′ yields a lower bound on the
manipulations required to realise any complete order starting with π′. This property of the DistanceToSTV
MINLP allows us to form a branch-and-bound algorithm for computing the MOV in STV elections.
7.1 A Simple Lower Bounding Rule
Blom et al. [2016] present two methods for computing lower bounds on the degree of manipulation required
to realise IRV elimination sequences that end in a partial order π′, without requiring the solving of an LP. We
adapt the logic underlying these rules to develop a lower bounding rule applicable to partial orders in STV
elections. Given a partial order π′ (a sequence of candidate eliminations and elections), this rule computes
a lower bound on the number of vote manipulations required to realise any complete order starting with π′.
Consider an STV election E = (C,B,Q, N,E), and a partial order π′. We can infer from π′, the set
of vote signatures s ∈ S that could potentially lie in the tally of each candidate c ∈ C in each round of
election or elimination j in π′ (this set is denoted Pcj , as defined in Section 6.1). Consequently, we can infer
the maximum possible number of votes that could lie in the tally of each candidate c in each round j (the
total number of votes cast with a signature s ∈ Pcj), V
max
cj , under the assumption that no manipulation
has yet taken place (Equation 21). Recall that Ns denotes the number of votes in B that have been cast
with signature s ∈ S. Irrespective of when a candidate c is elected or eliminated, c’s tally will contain at
least all cast votes in which they are the first preference (their primary vote fp(c), as per Definition 4). The
minimum number of votes in c’s tally, in any round j, V minc , is equal to c’s primary vote (Equation 22).
V maxcj =
∑
s∈Pcj
Ns ∀c ∈ C, j ∈ {1, . . . , |π
′|} (21)
V minc = fp(c) ∀c ∈ C (22)
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Candidate Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
c1 [c1], [c1, c3] [c1], [c1, c3] —
c2 [c2, c3], [c2, c3, c4] [c2, c3], [c2, c3, c4] [c2, c3], [c2, c3, c4]
c3 [c3, c4] — —
c4 [c4, c1, c2] [c4, c1, c2], [c3, c4] [c4, c1, c2], [c3, c4]
(a)
Candidate Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
c1 26 26 —
c2 10 10 10
c3 9 — —
c4 15 24 24
(b)
Table 3: (a) Possible distribution of vote signatures, in each round of counting of the STV election of Table
1, assuming the candidate order π = [(c3, 0), (c1, 1), (c2, 1), (c4, 0)] is realised; and (b) the maximum tally
value for each candidate, in each round of counting, assuming no vote manipulation has yet taken place.
We consider each election and elimination in π′. Let cj denote the candidate elected or eliminated in
round j of π′. If cj is elected, cj must have a quota’s worth of votes in their tally (unless the number of seats
left to be filled in round j equals the number of candidates still standing at the start of round j). To ensure
that cj has a quota’s worth of votes at the start of round j, we must modify at least lq votes (Equation 23).
lq(cj , π
′) = max(0,Q− Vmaxcjj ) (23)
If candidate cj is eliminated, cj must have fewer votes than all other candidates still standing at the start
of round j, denoted Sj , and no remaining candidate can have a quota’s worth of votes. To ensure that cj
has fewer votes than all candidates in Sj , we must modify at least l
1
e votes (Equation 24). To ensure that no
remaining candidate has a quota’s worth of votes at the start of round j, we must modify at least l2e votes
(Equation 25). To ensure that cj is eliminated in round j, we must modify at least le = max(l
1
e , l
2
e) votes.
l1e(cj , π
′) = arg maxc′∈Sj\{cj}max(0, V
min
cj
− V maxc′j ) (24)
l2e(cj , π
′) = arg maxc′∈Sj max(0, V
min
c′ −Q) (25)
Equation 25 will ensure that no candidate has more than a quota’s worth of votes in round j. To ensure
that a candidate has less than a quota, their tally value must be less than or equal to Q− ǫ, where ǫ≪ 1.
As we are computing a lower bound on required vote manipulation, we ignore the ǫ term for simplicity.
A lower bound on the degree of manipulation required to realise a complete order starting with π′ is
computed by taking the maximum of lq and le for each candidate elected, and eliminated, in π
′.
lb(π′) = arg maxj
{
lq(cj , π
′) if cj is elected
le(cj , π
′) if cj is eliminated
(26)
Example 1. Consider the STV election of Table 1 and the candidate order π = [(c3, 0), (c1, 1), (c2, 1), (c4,
0)], where candidate c3 is eliminated in Round 1, c1 is elected in Round 2, and c2 is elected Round 3. We
now use our lower bounding rule to compute a lower bound on the number of vote manipulations required to
realise this order of elections and eliminations. The original winners in this election are candidates c1 and
c3 (E = {c1, c3}). Given the cast votes listed in Table 1a, we determine where these vote signatures would
lie (i.e., in which candidates tally), in each round of counting (until all seats have been filled), assuming π
is realised (Table 3a). Prior to any manipulation of the cast votes, the maximum value of each candidates
tally, in each round, is listed in Table 3b. The minimum value of each candidates tally, in each round,
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margin-stv(E = (C,B,Q, N,E))
1 F ← ∅
2 UB ← estimate-upper-bound(E) ⊲ Compute winner elimination or Simple-STV upper bound
3 A ← {1, 0}
4 for(c ∈ C)
5 for(a ∈ A)
6 π′ ← [(c, a)]
7 l ← DistanceToSTV (E , π
′)
8 if(l < UB)
9 F ← F ∪ {(l, π′)}
10 while F 6= ∅
11 (l, π′) ← argminF ⊲ Select partial order with the smallest assigned lower bound
12 F ← F \ {(l, π′)}
13 UB ← expand(π′, UB, F, E , A)
14 F ← prune(F, UB) ⊲ Partial orders with lower bounds ≥ UB are pruned from F
15 return UB
expand(π′, UB, F, E = (C,B,Q, N,E), A)
16 UB′ ← UB
17 for(c ∈ standing(π′, C)) ⊲ For each candidate c still standing at the end of π′
18 for(a ∈ A)
19 π ← π′ ++[(c, a)] ⊲ A new partial order is created by eliminating or electing c
20 if(valid(π, E)) ⊲ Valid orders do not re-elect all candidates in E
21 l ← DistanceToSTV (E , π)
22 if(|π| = |C|)
23 UB′ ← min {UB′, l}
24 continue
25 if(l < UB′)
26 F ← F ∪ {(l, π)} ⊲ The new partial order is added to the frontier F
27 return UB′
Figure 3: The margin-stv algorithm for computing the MOV of an STV election E = (C,B,Q, N,E) with
candidates C, votes B, quota Q, seats N , and winners E ⊂ C.
is equal to their primary vote. Here, V minc1 = 26, V
min
c2
= 10, V minc3 = 9, and V
min
c4
= 15. We consider
each election and elimination in π. To eliminate c3 in Round 1, c3 must have fewer votes than all other
candidates. Here, l1e(c3, π) = 0 (no manipulation is required to ensure c3 has the fewest votes). No candidate
can have a quota’s worth of votes in Round 1. In this example, the quota is 21 votes, l2e(c3, π) = 5, and
le(c3, π) = 5. To elect c1 in Round 2, we must ensure that c1 has a quota in Round 2. Here, lq(c1, π) =
max(0,Q − V maxc12 ) = max(0, 21 − 26) = 0. To elect c2 in Round 3, we must ensure that c2 has a quota in
Round 3. Here, lq(c2, π) = max(0,Q− V
max
c23 ) = max(0, 21− 10) = 11. Consequently, a lower bound on the
manipulation required to realise π is lb(π) = max{le(c3, π), lq(c1, π), lq(c2, π)} = max{5, 0, 11} = 11.
We describe, in Section 8, how this lower bounding rule can be used to avoid solving the DistanceToSTV
MINLP for some partial orders explored by the margin-stv algorithm.
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8 Computing Margins in STV Elections (margin-stv)
Figure 3 defines our margin-stv algorithm for computing the MOV of an STV election. The margin-stv
algorithm maintains an initially empty frontier of partial candidate orders F (Step 1). An upper bound UB
on the STV MOV is computed in Step 2. In our implementation of margin-stv we use the minimum of the
winner elimination upper bound of Figure 2 and the Simple-STV upper bound of Section 5. The frontier F is
populated with partial candidate orders of size one (the election or elimination of a single candidate)—each
of which is assigned a lower bound on required manipulations with DistanceToSTV—in Steps 4 – 9. Partial
orders with a lower bound less than the current upper bound UB are added to F in Step 9.
Example 2. Consider the STV election of Table 1. The winner elimination upper bound is 2 votes and
the Simple-STV bound is 6 votes. In Step 2, the current upper bound UB is initialised to 2. The partial
candidate orders [(c1, 0)], [(c1, 1)], [(c2, 0)], [(c2, 1)], [(c3, 0)], [(c3, 1)], [(c4, 0)], and [(c4, 1)] are created, and
assigned lower bounds by DistanceToSTV of 11, 0, 6, 11, 6, 12, 8, and 6, respectively. Only [(c1, 1)] is
added to F in Step 9. Figure 4 visualises the search tree explored by margin-stv in this example.
Once the frontier F is populated with partial orders of size one, Steps 10 to 14 expand these orders in the
search for an alternate outcome for the election that requires the smallest degree of manipulation to realise.
Partial orders with the smallest assigned lower bound are expanded in turn. A partial order π′ is expanded
by first removing it from the frontier (Step 12). For each candidate c not mentioned in π′, two new partial
orders are formed in which c is elected (π′ ++[(c, 1)]) and eliminated (π′ ++[(c, 0)]) in successive iterations
of the loop in Steps 18 to 26. If the new partial order π is valid (i.e., it does not elect the same candidates
elected in the original winners set E), it is evaluated with DistanceToSTV (Step 21). If π contains all
candidates (it is a complete order), it represents an alternate election outcome requiring l vote manipulations
to realise (l is computed by DistanceToSTV in Step 21). If l is less than the current upper bound, UB,
UB is replaced with l (Step 23). If π is not a complete order, it is added to F if l is less than UB (Step 26).
We repeatedly expand the partial order with the smallest assigned lower bound, updating the frontier F ,
until F is empty (there are no remaining partial orders that can be expanded). At this point, the algorithm
terminates and returns the current upper bound UB as the election MOV in Step 15.
Example 3 (Example 2 cont). The frontier, F , now contains one partial order π′ = [(c1, 1)]. The following
partial orders are formed and evaluated with DistanceToSTV in successive executions of Step 19 and 21:
[(c1, 1), (c2, 0)] Lower bound of 0
[(c1, 1), (c2, 1)] Lower bound of 12
[(c1, 1), (c3, 0)] Lower bound of 2
[(c1, 1), (c3, 1)] Invalid as the original winners c1 and c3 are both elected
[(c1, 1), (c4, 0)] Lower bound of 3
[(c1, 1), (c4, 1)] Lower bound of 7
Only [(c1, 1), (c2, 0)] is added to F in Step 26. At this point, F = {[(c1, 1), (c2, 0)]}, and [(c1, 1), (c2, 0)]
is the next order expanded in Step 13. The following complete orders are formed in successive executions of
Step 19 (in our implementation of margin-stv, we complete all partial orders formed in Step 19 with their
‘obvious’ ending if possible—i.e., if there is only one candidate remaining). All orders have a lower bound
greater than the current upper bound of 2, and are pruned from consideration.
[(c1, 1), (c2, 0), (c3, 0), (c4, 1)] DistanceToSTV evaluation of 3
[(c1, 1), (c2, 0), (c3, 1), (c4, 0)] Invalid as original winners c1 and c3 are elected
[(c1, 1), (c2, 0), (c4, 0), (c3, 1)] Invalid as original winners c1 and c3 are elected
[(c1, 1), (c2, 0), (c4, 1), (c3, 0)] DistanceToSTV evaluation of 6
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[(c1,0)] [(c1,1)] [(c2,0)] [(c2,1)] [(c3,0)] [(c3,1)] [(c4,0)] [(c4,1)]
11 0 6 11 6 12 8 6
[(c1,1), (c2, 0)] [(c1,1), (c2, 1)] [(c1,1), (c3, 0)] [(c1,1), (c4, 0)] [(c1,1), (c4, 1)]
0 12 2 3 7
[(c1,1), (c2, 0), (c3, 0), (c4, 1)] [(c1,1), (c2, 0), (c4, 1), (c3, 0)]
3 6
Figure 4: Complete search tree explored in the application of margin-stv to the STV election of Table 1,
among candidates c1, c2, c3, and c4. The initial upper bound on the MOV in this example is 2 votes.
After pruning all partial orders from F , the frontier is empty and the algorithm returns the upper bound
of 2 as the election MOV in Step 15. In this example, margin-stv has shown that there is no better
manipulation (requiring fewer vote changes) than that inferred by the winner elimination upper bound.
In Steps 7 and 21, where DistanceToSTV is evaluated for a partial (or complete) order π, we can use the
lower bounding rule of Section 7.1 to compute an initial lower bound for π, l′. If l′ ≥ UB, the current upper
bound, we need not solve DistanceToSTV as π can immediately be pruned from consideration. If l
′ < UB,
we can solve DistanceToSTV to get a second lower bound for π, l. We can then assign to π the maximum
of the two lower bounds l′ and l. In Section 9, we examine the relative performance ofmargin-stv, in terms
of the number of DistanceToSTV MINLPs solved and the runtime of the algorithm, in the setting where
this extra lower bounding computation is performed, and when it is omitted.
8.1 Implementation Details
We use SCIP [Achterberg, 2009] to solve each MINLP formed by margin-stv. In practice, we have found
that some instances of DistanceToSTV , even for small election instances, can be difficult for SCIP to solve
in reasonable time. Consequently, we terminate MINLP solves if the time since a last improving solution
has been found reaches a pre-specified time limit. If a partial order π′ is being evaluated, and the MINLP
is terminated before an optimal solution is found, the best objective value (a lower bound on the optimal
objective) is assigned to π′ as its lower bound. If a complete order π is being evaluated, and the MINLP
is terminated before finding an optimal solution, π is inserted into the frontier F with a lower bound equal
to the best objective value of the MINLP, and the current upper bound is not revised (as would normally
occur after evaluating a complete order). The result is that margin-stv may terminate with a frontier that
contains a number of complete orders (that cannot be further expanded) with a smallest lower bound L, and
a current upper bound UB that is greater than L (i.e., the algorithm returns with a lower and upper bound
on the MOV, but not an exact value). This occurs for a number of elections in our test set in Section 9.
It is clear from the evaluation of margin-stv, in Section 9, on small STV elections (with candidate
numbers ranging from 4 to 13) that it will not scale to more realistic elections with dozens of candidates. To
improve its scalability, we vary the algorithm so that a MIP relaxation of the DistanceToSTV is constructed
16
to evaluate each partial and complete order formed in Steps 6 and 19 of Figure 3. We consider two types of
relaxation. The first replaces each bilinear term present in the MINLP (these terms appear in Constraints
(17) and (20)) with McCormick [1976] inequalities. Each bilinear term x y, where x and y are continuous
variables with domains [xL, xU ] and [yL, yU ], is replaced with variable z = x y. Variable z is defined by
Equations (27) to (30). The optimal solution of the relaxed DistanceToSTV is a lower bound on that of
the MINLP. The MOV computed by margin-stv, in this context, is a lower bound on the true MOV. An
illustration of the McCormick envelope is shown in Figure 5(a) when z is fixed.
z ≥ yL x+ xL y − xL yL (27)
z ≥ yU x+ xU y − xU yU (28)
z ≤ yU x+ xL y − xL yU (29)
z ≤ yL x+ xU y − zU yL (30)
Our second relaxation replaces each bilinear term present in the MINLP (these terms appear in Con-
straints (17) and (20)) with a piecewise linear relaxation (specifically, a relaxation proposed by Gounaris et al.
[2009]). The result is again a MIP relaxation of the DistanceToSTV whose optimal solution is a lower bound
on that of the MINLP. Given a product of two continuous variables x and y (a bilinear term x y), the piece-
wise linear relaxation we apply is defined as follows (replicated from the work of Gounaris et al. [2009]),
where the variable z = x y replaces the bilinear term where it appears in the original MINLP. We divide the
domain of x into K ranges ([x0, x1], . . . , [xk−1, xk]) and introduce a binary variable λk to indicate whether
x has a value in range [xk−1, xk]. Constraint (31) ensures that only one λk can take on a value of 1. The
domain of variable y is [yL, yU ]. The variable δyk defines the “deviation of variable y from its lower bound y
L,
if x ∈ [xk−1, xk]” and is set to 0 if the value of x lies outside of this range [Gounaris et al., 2009]. Figure 5(b)
shows how the relaxation improves when we break the domain of x into two ranges xl..xm and xm..xu.
K∑
k=1
λk = 1 (31)
K∑
k=1
xk−1 λk ≤ x ≤
K∑
k=1
xk λk (32)
y = yL +
K∑
k=1
δyk (33)
0 ≤ δyk ≤ (y
U − yL)λk ∀k (34)
z ≥ yU x+
K∑
k=1
xk δyk − (y
U − yL)
K∑
k=1
xk λk (35)
x ≤ yU x+
K∑
k=1
xk−1 δyk − (y
U − yL)
K∑
k=1
xk−1 λk (36)
z ≤ yL x+
K∑
k=1
xk δyk (37)
z ≥ yL x+
K∑
k=1
(38)
In the DistanceToSTV MINLP, variables τj and ypi[j],j,s (Constraint (17)), and τj and ρj (Constraint
(20)) participate in bilinear terms. We treat the transfer value of votes distributed from the candidate elected
17
convex
overestimators
convex
underestimators
y
uy
y
l
x
lx ux
convex
overestimators
convex
underestimators
x
y
uy
y
l
l
uxx xm
m
y
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Illustration of McCormick envelopes (a) for z = xy in the range x ∈ xl..xu, y ∈ yl..yu, and (b)
when the range of x is divided in two.
in round j, τj , as x in the piecewise linear relaxation scheme presented above, with variables ypi[j],j,s (the
total value of votes of signature s in the tally of candidate π[j] at the start of round j) and ρj (the number
of transferable votes in the tally of the candidate elected in round j) as y. In Section 9, we discretise the
domain of τj into varying numbers of segments (by varying K), and compare the resulting lower bounds (on
margins) found by margin-stv to the true MOV found when no such relaxation is used.
In their algorithm for computing margins in IRV elections, Magrino et al. [2011] recognise that their
DistanceTo LP, defined to compute the smallest number of vote changes required to realise a particular
(partial or complete) elimination order, need only consider a subset of possible vote signatures (in place of
all possible partial and total orderings over the set of candidates). Given an elimination order π, specifying
which candidates are eliminated in each counting round, Magrino et al. [2011] note that classes of ballot
signatures, denoted equivalence classes, will behave in the same way (be transferred between candidates in
the same way) as counting progresses. Consequently, each DistanceTo LP need only contain variables
defining the number of votes of each equivalence class present in the modified election profile. The definition
of equivalence classes presented by Magrino et al. [2011] can be applied in the context of both IRV and STV
elections, given an elimination sequence (for an IRV election) and a sequence of elections and eliminations
(for an STV election). In our implementation of margin-stv, we define the DistanceToSTV MINLP (and
its relaxations) over signature equivalence classes (i.e., the set S contains the signatures of all equivalence
classes, in place of all partial and total orders over the set of candidates C).
9 Evaluation
We first evaluatemargin-stv on a set of small STV elections. To do so, we take 16 IRV elections conducted
in the US between 2007 and 2010, and re-imagine them as STV elections with 2 available seats (Appendix
A lists the names of each of these elections, alongside the number of candidates, and number of votes cast).
The number of candidates in these elections range between 4 and 13. All experiments in this paper have
been conducted on a machine with an Intel Xeon ES-2440 2.40GHz 6 core processor, and 64GB of RAM.
Table 4 reports the results of margin-stv – without and with the use of the lower bounding rule of
Section 7.1 – on 16 small IRV (re-imagined as STV) elections. We record: the number of candidates |C|
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margin-stv margin-stv with LB of Sec 7.1
# |C| Best UB MOV MINLPs Time MOV MINLPs Time
solved (s) solved (s)
1 4 38,199 30,654 – 37,908 54 2,528 30,654 – 37,908 35 2,421
2 4 5,683 2,725 – 2,726 17 900 2,725 – 2,726 7 139
3 4 6,530 6,359 – 6,360 25 464 6,359 – 6,360 19 649
4 4 2,527 63 18 171 63 14 169
5 4 653 59 17 20 59 11 19
6 4 763 375 23 708 375 13 1,086
7 5 7,500 7,499 – 7,500 48 213 7,499 – 7,500 30 211
8 5 1,079 628 – 629 45 2,972 628 – 629 30 2,972
9 5 1,425 659 – 660 38 2,331 659 – 660 26 2,318
10 5 422 164 – 165 42 565 164 – 165 22 459
11 7 1,719 441 58 1 441 39 1
12 7 2,289 1,326– 1,327 2,247 13,693 1,326 – 1,327 1,006 12,058
13 8 2,857 1,216 – 1,576 — ∞ 1,309 – 1,576 — ∞
14 11 1,178 309 – 1,178 — ∞ 351 – 1,178 — ∞
15 11 63 4 244 107 4 190 106
16 13 2,188 823 – 2,188 — ∞ 0 – 2,188 — ∞
Table 4: Application of margin-stv to 16 US IRV elections re-imagined as STV elections with 2 seats,
reporting: the number of candidates (|C|); best upper bound on the MOV; computed MOV (or bounds on
the MOV); number of MINLPs solved; and algorithm runtime (in seconds) (∞ represents a time out of 12
hours) without and with the use of the lower bounding rule of Sec. 7.1. Best results for bounds are bolded.
in the election; the best computed upper bound on the MOV (the minimum of the winner elimination and
Simple-STV upper bound); the MOV returned by margin-stv (or bounds on the MOV); the number of
DistanceToSTV MINLPs solved by the algorithm; and the time taken by margin-stv to compute the
MOV (in seconds). SCIP [Achterberg, 2009] is used to solve all DistanceToSTV MINLPs. We terminate
each run of margin-stv after 12 hours, and infer a lower and upper bound on the MOV from the state of
the frontier. Our algorithm did not terminate for three instances (13, 14, and 16) within 12 hours. In 11/16
instances, our algorithm could not produce an exact MOV, but a lower and upper bound on the MOV. In
7/11 instances, the lower and upper bound differed by only 1 vote (i.e., margin-stv was able to produce
very tight bounds on the MOV). Table 4 shows that our lower bounding rule can, in some instances, reduce
the runtime of the algorithm. For instances 1, 2, 10, and 12, runtimes are reduced by 107, 761, 106, and 1,635
seconds. Our lower bounding rule can increase the runtime of the algorithm—for instances 3 and 6, runtimes
are increased by 185 and 378 seconds. Our lower bounding rule consistently reduces the number of MINLPs
solved, but if these MINLPs are quickly deemed infeasible by SCIP [Achterberg, 2009], the additional time
spent computing lower bounds for each partial order visited becomes an overhead.
Table 5 reports the results of the relaxed margin-stv algorithm (with bilinear terms replaced by
McCormick [1976] inequalities) in each STV instance of Table 4, without and with the lower bounding
rule of Section 7.1. CPLEX 12.5 is used to solve all DistanceToSTV MIPs formed by our margin-stv
relaxations. We report the lower bound on the MOV found by margin-stv alongside the exact MOV (or
bounds on the exact MOV) reported in Table 4. The lower bounds found by margin-stv (with McCormick
[1976] inequalities) are often significantly lower than the exact MOV. Our lower bounding rule is beneficial in
this setting – it often discovers tighter lower bounds on partial and complete orders than the MIP relaxation
of DistanceToSTV (in 7/16 instances, applying the lower bounding rule results in a tighter lower bound
being found by relaxed margin-stv), and reduces runtimes significantly for larger instances.
Relaxed margin-stv (with McCormick [1976] inequalities and our lower bounding rule) can compute a
lower bound on the margin in each of our 16 STV instances within 12 hours. However, in 5/16 instances
a trivial lower bound of 0 is found. We consider whether solving a piecewise linear relaxation of each
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margin-stv margin-stv with LB of Sec 7.1
# |C| Exact MOV MOV MIPs Time MOV MIPs Time
Bounds (LB) solved (s) (LB) solved (s)
1 4 30,654 – 37,908 17,662 28 0.8 23,079 11 0.2
2 4 2,725 – 2,726 399 15 0.2 789 5 0.1
3 4 6,359 – 6,360 3245 28 0.4 6356 12 0.1
4 4 63 0 12 0.1 0 8 0.1
5 4 59 0 13 0.1 0 7 0.1
6 4 375 43 19 0.1 46 10 0.1
7 5 7,499 – 7,500 0 23 0.3 0 13 0.2
8 5 628 – 629 218 33 0.3 339 20 0.3
9 5 659 – 660 64 26 0.3 64 17 0.3
10 5 164 – 165 34 25 0.2 91 19 0.4
11 7 441 441 57 0.6 441 38 0.6
12 7 1,326 – 1,327 413 48 0.9 859 166 4
13 8 1,309 – 1,576 289 215 8 289 117 4
14 11 351 – 1,178 0 723 217 0 347 36
15 11 4 4 243 8 4 189 11
16 13 823 – 2,188 0 — ∞ 0 21,520 23,243
Table 5: Application of relaxed margin-stv (bilinear terms replaced with McCormick [1976] inequalities,
without and with the lower bounding rule of Sec. 7.1) to the STV elections of Table 4, reporting: the number
of candidates (|C|); the best known bounds on MOV from Table 4; lower bound on the MOV computed by
margin-stv; number of MIPs solved; and algorithm runtime (in seconds). Best lower bounds are bolded.
DistanceToSTV MINLP, as described in Section 8.1, results in margin-stv finding better lower bounds.
Table 6 reports the results of piecewise-relaxed margin-stv (with the use of our lower bounding rule) given
varying K (with higher values of K forming a more accurate relaxation of each DistanceToSTV MINLP).
In general, the resulting MOV lower bounds increase as K increases. The counter-example is instance 16, for
which margin-stv computes lower bounds of 760, 95, 17, and 0 for K = 5, 10, 15, and 20. As K increases,
the MIP relaxations solved throughout the algorithm become more complex and time consuming to solve.
Consequently, margin-stv makes less progress through the space of partial orders in instance 16 within the
12 hour time limit. In the K = 5 setting, margin-stv finds reasonable lower bounds in most instances.
The exact MOV is found in 2 instances (11 and 15). In instance 13, we find a margin that lies within the
bounds found on the MOV by the exact algorithm. Across instances 1 to 3, 6, 8 to 10, 12, and 16, the MOV
lower bounds discovered are, on average, 14.4% below the exact MOV (or lower bound on the MOV found
by the exact algorithm). In instances 4 and 5, piecewise-relaxed margin-stv finds trivial lower bounds of
0, however the exact MOV in these instances is small (63 and 59 votes, respectively).
9.1 Real-World STV Elections
In the preceding section we have evaluated margin-stv on a series of IRV elections (re-imagined as STV
elections with 2 seats) held in the US between 2007 and 2010. The number of candidates in these elections
range from 4 to 13. STV elections often involve a large number of candidates. In the 2012 election of
senators to the ACT senate in Australia, 5-7 senators were elected in each of 3 districts. An STV election
was held for each district, involving 20, 26, and 28 candidates. In the 2014 Victorian senate election in
Australia, 5 senators were elected in each of 5 districts. The number of candidates in these elections ranged
from 37 to 52. The use of margin-stv for elections of this size, without relaxation, is not feasible (due to
the complexity of the DistanceToSTV MINLPs that must be solved). We demonstrate the value of our
margin-stv algorithm for computing lower bounds on the margin in a number of real-world STV elections.
In addition to the use of MINLP relaxations (McCormick [1976] inequalities and piecewise-linear relax-
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K = 5 K = 10
# Exact MOV MOV MIPs Time MOV MIPs Time
Bounds LB solved (s) LB solved (s)
1 30,654 – 37,908 28,038 12 1 29,020 12 1
2 2,725 – 2,726 2,265 6 0.5 2,512 6 1
3 6,359 – 6,360 6,356 13 0.4 6,356 17 2
4 63 0 8 0.1 0 8 0.1
5 59 0 7 0.4 10 9 1
6 375 327 10 0.2 337 10 0.6
7 7,499 – 7,500 5,168 14 0.9 6,347 28 4
8 628 – 629 531 24 2 581 25 7
9 659 – 660 558 19 0.9 609 19 3
10 164 – 165 133 19 4 141 19 3
11 441 441 38 0.7 441 38 0.8
12 1,326 – 1,327 1049 486 37 1,211 698 83
13 1,309 – 1,576 1321 538 65 1,431 636 243
14 351 – 1,178 53 84 22 602 3,008 2,900
15 4 4 189 22 4 189 27
16 823 – 2,188 760 7,025 35,583 95 — ∞
K = 15 K = 20
# Exact MOV MOV MIPs Time MOV MIPs Time
Bounds LB solved (s) LB solved (s)
1 20,654 – 37,908 29,549 12 3 29,968 12 3
2 2,725 – 2,726 2,582 6 2 2,609 6 1
3 6,359 – 6,360 6,356 17 2 6,356 17 1
4 63 0 11 0.4 0 11 1
5 59 28 9 1 35 9 1
6 375 351 10 1 358 10 2
7 7,499 – 7,500 6,721 29 3 6,923 29 4
8 628 – 629 598 25 10 606 25 12
9 659 – 660 623 19 5 638 20 4
10 164 – 165 147 19 6 155 19 6
11 441 441 38 0.6 441 38 1
12 1,326 – 1,327 1,221 700 105 1,257 758 185
13 1,309 – 1,576 1,468 747 452 1,486 754 638
14 351 – 1,178 785 10,511 15,732 878 13,786 28,909
15 4 4 189 33 4 189 39
16 823 – 2,188 17 — ∞ 0 — ∞
Table 6: Application of piecewise-relaxed margin-stv (with the lower bounding rule of Sec. 7.1) to the
STV elections of Table 4, reporting: the best known bounds MOV from Table 4; lower bound on the MOV
computed by piecewise-relaxed margin-stv; number of MIPs solved; and algorithm runtime (in seconds).
ations), we parallelise the exploration of the frontier of partial candidate orders. In place of selecting one
partial candidate order to expand (at Step 13 of Figure 3), we select the first NF (where NF is a parameter)
orders in the frontier F . Each of these orders is expanded in parallel, and the frontier updated accordingly –
the children of all expanded orders with DistanceToSTV evaluations that are less than the current upper
bound are inserted into the frontier. This upper bound is revised, and orders pruned from the frontier, when
a complete order is found with a DistanceToSTV evaluation that is lower than the current upper bound.
The number of variables and constraints in the DistanceToSTV models solved by margin-stv is de-
termined by the number of candidates in the orders being evaluated. In most STV elections, the number of
available seats is much less than the number of candidates. Consequently, these orders will contain lengthy se-
quences of candidate eliminations. To limit the memory and solve time requirements of the DistanceToSTV
models formed by margin-stv, we group these sequences of eliminated candidates together, ignoring con-
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Election Seats |C| Quota Votes Upper K Lower Time (s) MIPs
cast Bound Bound Solved
on MOV on MOV
Dublin North 4 13 8,789 43,942 211 5 0 46 400
15 181 2,905 487
25 185 10,808 276
35 199 50,994 394
Dublin West 3 9 7,498 29,988 385 5 0 15 143
15 153 241 147
25 211 506 153
35 235 1,628 151
60 257 3,914 155
80 267 14,649 161
100 269 38,660 157
Meath 5 15 10,681 64,081 1,135 5 275 – 1,997
15 275 72,349 549
Table 7: The winner elimination upper bound, and lower bound on the MOV, computed for 3 STV elections
held in the 2002 Irish General Election (for varying values of K). The number of seats, candidates, quota,
and number of votes cast in each election is reported, alongside the runtime (in seconds) of margin-stv (–
indicates that the algorithm reached the 24 hour timeout) and the number of MIPs solved.
straints that enforce their relative elimination order (i.e., these candidates are effectively eliminated in a
single round of counting). Grouping eliminated candidates together reduces the number of constraints
required, and significantly reduces the number of vote equivalence classes that need to be considered, in each
DistanceToSTV model. This grouping adds an additional level of relaxation to the algorithm.
We consider, in this section, the performance of margin-stv on 28 STV elections. We consider: the
2013 and 2016 election of 2 candidates to the Federal Senate for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
and Northern Territory (NT); the 2002 election of 4, 3, and 5 candidates to the lower house of the Irish
parliament (the Da´il E´ireann) representing the Dublin North, Dublin West, and Meath constituencies; and
21 STV elections electing 3 to 4 candidates (out of 8 to 13, per ward) to the Glasgow City Council in 2007.
Data for the Irish and Scottish STV elections were obtained from PrefLib2. In each experiment reported in
this section, margin-stv has been afforded a time limit of 24 hours. If this time limit is reached, and the
algorithm has not converged, we report the best lower bounds on the MOV computed in that time period.
Unless otherwise stated, we set NF = 5 and run margin-stv with increasing values of K (from K = 5 to
K = 100) until the resulting lower bound does not improve, or is within 10% of the best known upper bound.
9.2 2002 Irish General Election
We first consider the 2002 election of 4, 3, and 5 candidates (out of 13, 9, and 15) to the Irish lower house
to represent Dublin North, Dublin West, and Meath. Table 7 reports, for each election, the quota, number
of votes cast, and the best known upper bound on the MOV (computed as per Figure 2 and Section 5). For
increasing values of K, we report the lower bound on the MOV computed by margin-stv over a 24 hour
period, the runtime (in seconds) of the algorithm (if less than 24 hours), and the number of MIPs solved.
9.3 2007 Glasgow City Council
In the 2007 Glasgow City Council election, 3 to 4 candidates (out of 8 to 13) were elected in 21 STV elections
(one for each of 21 wards). Tables 8 and 9 report the quota, number of votes cast, and the best known upper
2www.preflib.org
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Election Seats |C| Quota Votes MOV K MOV Time MIPs
cast Upper Lower (s) Solved
Bound Bound
Linn 4 11 1,914 9,567 221 5 94 1,147 1,840
15 139 – 5,867
Newlands 3 9 2,164 8,654 88 5 47 14 203
15 76 78 284
25 81 363 284
Greater Pollock 4 9 1,737 8,682 223 5 125 1,866 1,647
15 197 38,428 3,349
25 159* – 2,304
Craigton 4 10 2,211 11,052 93 5 0 62 174
15 0 493 175
25 25 1,176 168
35 37 11,321 179
50 43 39,892 188
80 31* – 164
Govan 4 11 1,913 9,560 278 5 149 – 10,808
15 131* – 5,226
Pollockshields 3 9 2,392 9,567 30 5 0 1 39
15 0 6 39
25 2 19 39
35 4 20 39
80 4 347 39
100 6 681 39
Langside 3 8 2,334 9,334 246 5 124 25 224
15 193 555 545
25 209 3,350 553
35 217 7,266 742
45 221 14,495 746
55 224 19,341 752
Southside Central 4 9 1,748 8,738 231 5 113 1,306 1,418
15 187 68,537 2,313
25 118* – 1,120
Calton 3 10 1,300 5,199 959 5 215 18,369 39,356
15 130* – 20,048
Anderston 4 9 1,381 6,900 106 5 3 57 168
15 64 5,596 346
25 85 16,784 407
35 94 51,571 517
Hillhead 4 10 1,797 8,984 112 5 0 35 271
15 41 1,621 270
25 55 8,277 270
35 58 27,949 265
45 0* – 251
Table 8: The best known upper bound, and lower bound on the MOV, computed for the first 11/21 STV
elections held in the 2007 Glasgow City Council Election (for varying values of K). The number of seats,
candidates, quota, and number of votes cast in each election is reported, alongside the runtime (in seconds)
ofmargin-stv (– indicates that the algorithm reached the 24 hour timeout) and the number of MIPs solved.
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Election Seats |C| Quota Votes MOV K MOV Time MIPs
cast Upper Lower (s) Solved
Bound Bound
Partick West 4 9 2,549 12,744 194 5 18 22 166
15 133 728 207
25 174 6,407 311
35 187 10,343 354
Garscadden 4 10 2,033 10,160 449 5 197 – 5,080
15 96* – 780
Drumchapel 4 10 1,737 8,680 1,325 5 335 19,325 16,257
15 0* – 353
Maryhill 4 8 1,981 9,901 292 5 70 140 329
15 203 11,580 606
25 226 25,849 776
35 234 78,380 747
45 194* – 482
Canal 4 11 1,725 8,624 148 5 68 487 576
15 98 9,384 729
25 108 36,690 852
35 109 79,946 844
45 69* – 300
Springburn 3 10 1,353 5,410 1,014 5 447 22,772 37,236
15 305* – 3,979
East Centre 4 13 1,816 9,078 134 5 73 26,753 16,360
15 71* – 10,389
Shettleston 4 11 1,761 8,803 355 5 158 – 13,014
15 145* – 4,817
Baillieston 4 11 2,076 10,376 108 5 0 457 266
15 38 2,088 347
25 46 11,122 345
35 58 49,942 383
45 64 74,870 390
55 8* – 300
North East 4 10 1,673 8,363 911 5 275 52,653 9,967
15 60* – 385
Table 9: The best known upper bound, and lower bound on the MOV, computed for the second 10/21 STV
elections held in the 2007 Glasgow City Council Election (for varying values of K). The number of seats,
candidates, quota, and number of votes cast in each election is reported, alongside the runtime (in seconds)
ofmargin-stv (– indicates that the algorithm reached the 24 hour timeout) and the number of MIPs solved.
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Election Seats |C| Quota Votes Upper K Lower Time (s) MIPs
cast Bound Bound Solved
on MOV on MOV
2013 NT 2 24 34,494 103,479 25,777 5 223 – 561,999
2016 NT 2 19 34,010 102,027 23,373 5 3121 – 219,876
2013 ACT 2 27 82,248 246,742 35,476 5 82 – 112,629
2016 ACT 2 22 84,923 254,767 44,499 5 205 – 86,825
Table 10: The best known upper bound, and lower bound on the MOV, computed for the 2013 and 2016
NT and ACT Federal Senate elections (for varying values of K). The number of seats, candidates, quota,
and number of votes cast in each election is reported, alongside the runtime (in seconds) of margin-stv (–
indicates that the algorithm reached the 24 hour timeout) and the number of MIPs solved.
bound on the MOV (computed as per Figure 2 and Section 5). For increasing values of K, we report the
lower bound on the MOV computed by margin-stv over a 24 hour period, the runtime (in seconds) of the
algorithm (if less than 24 hours), and the number of MIPs solved. Instances where the MOV lower bound
computed within 24 hours reduces as K is increased are marked with an asterisk. Increasing K increases the
complexity, and solve times, of the MIPs being solved. These instances demonstrate that, as K increases,
the branch-and-bound search conducted by margin-stv may make less progress over the 24 hour period,
resulting in a lower (rather than improved) lower bound on the MOV.
9.4 2013 and 2016 NT and ACT Federal Senate
Table 10 reports lower bounds on the MOV computed for the 2013 and 2016 ACT and NT Federal Senate
elections. While these elections have a small number of seats (2), there are many candidates (between 19
and 27). In each of these elections, the two winning candidates have orders of magnitude more votes in
their initial tallies than all others. We expect the margin in these elections to be reasonably high (certainly
greater than a few hundred votes) as we need to change enough votes to ensure one of these candidates is
not awarded a seat (and that one alternate candidate is awarded a seat). The MOV lower bounds found by
margin-stv in Table 10 are likely to be much lower than the true margins.
The elections of Table 10 follow a similar pattern – a candidate is awarded a seat in the first round of
counting, and then a long sequence of candidates are eliminated before a second candidate achieves a quota
and is awarded a seat. In these circumstances, we can compute a lower bound on the MOV under the
assumption that we cannot change who is elected and eliminated in the first R rounds of counting. For large
values of R, this assumption prunes significant portions of the space of possible elimination and election
sequences from consideration. Consider the 2013 ACT election, in which the two available seats are awarded
in rounds 1 and 24. If we assumed the first 20 rounds (R = 20) are fixed (i.e., the first winner is elected in
round 1, and the candidates eliminated in rounds 2 to 20 are still eliminated, at some point, between rounds
2 to 20), Table 11 reports our computed lower bounds on the MOV for this election.
K Lower Bound Time (s) MIPs
on MOV Solved
5 5879 117 41
25 5879 4899 111
50 5911 12,386 112
80 5919 18,604 112
Table 11: Lower bounds on the MOV, computed for the 2013 ACT Federal Senate election, for varying values
of K, under the assumption that the first R = 20 rounds of the original count are fixed. For this election,
there are: 2 seats; 27 candidates; a quota of 82,248 votes; and an upper bound on the MOV of 35,476 votes.
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The lower bounds reported in Table 11, for the 2013 ACT Federal Senate election, are not guaranteed
lower bounds on the true margin of victory of the election. If we take the minimal manipulation discovered
by margin-stv in the K = 80 case, and simulate the modified election with the suggested vote changes put
in place, we find that the original winning candidates (c1w and c
2
w) are given a seat (in rounds 1 and in the
last round). However, the tallies of c2w and the runner up cr, at the point at which cr is eliminated differ in
only 159 votes. We consider an additional manipulation that awards 80 additional first preference votes to
the runner up cr, and removes 80 first preference votes from c
2
w (we effectively swap 80 votes that ranked
c2w first with a ranking that has cr in first place). Simulating this modified election gives us a different
outcome, with candidates c1w and cr elected to a seat (in rounds 1 and in the last round). For this election,
we now know that the MOV is no more than 5,999 votes – we were able to find an alternate outcome by
modifying 5,999 votes to an alternate ranking. The upper bounds found by the winner elimination upper
bound method of Figure 2, and the simple upper bound method of Section 5, are much higher than the true
MOV. This analysis suggests there are alternate ways of using margin-stv for computing lower and upper
bounds on the MOV for large, and challenging, elections (with many seats or large numbers of candidates).
In future work, we aim to explore this further.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop an algorithm,margin-stv, for computing exact margins of victory in STV elections,
assuming the use of the Inclusive Gregory method of surplus distribution. The algorithm is based on solving
a mixed-integer nonlinear formulation for the problem of computing a minimal manipulation to achieve a
desired election order. We are able to compute exact margins of victory for small elections, e.g. less than 12
candidates and 2 seats. For larger, real elections margin-stv is able to compute reasonable lower bounds
within 24 hours (as demonstrated on 28 real-world STV elections). The algorithm struggles on elections
with large numbers of candidates, essentially since the search space grows as the factorial of the number of
candidates, but provides an important first step in tackling this important and challenging problem.
As future work we plan to adapt the margin-stv algorithm to answer specific questions such as the
influence of instances of multiple-voting on election outcomes, and the impact of losing votes, similar to our
prior work [Blom et al., 2016] on Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. In addition, we aim to explore how
applying the algorithm to the tail of an STV election (i.e., by fixing the elections and eliminations that occur
in the first R rounds of counting) can be used within a practical algorithm for computing improved lower
and upper bounds on the MOV in challenging instances (with a large number of seats or candidates).
A US Election Data (2007 to 2010)
In the experiments of Section 9 we reimagine a series of 16 IRV elections conducted in the US between 2007
and 2010 as STV elections with 2 available seats. Table 12 records the name, number of candidates, and
number of votes cast, for each of these 16 elections. Candidate numbers range between 4 and 13.
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